

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-13 EUR-12 SSM-03 CIAE-00 PM-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-11 ACDA-12 OMB-01 SOE-02 DOE-15 MCT-01  
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R 201908Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8209  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
SECDEF WASH DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 11282

E.O. 11652: NA  
TAGS: PEPR PINT MILI EG XF  
SUBJECT: MINWAR GAMASY MEETING WITH NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

SUMMARY. PRIOR TO MEETING WITH SADAT, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE GROUPS HAD 45 MINUTE SESSION WITH MINWAR GEN. GAMASY AT HURGHADA ON APRIL 19. GAMASY SAID PEACE WILL TAKE A "LONG, LONG TIME" AND EVEN AFTER IT REACHED, EGYPT MUST RETAIN STRONG FORCES IN VIEW OF THREATS FROM ETHIOPIA AND LIBYA. IF SUDAN THREATENED BY SOVIET ENCROACHMENTS, "WE HAVE PLANS TO MOVE." MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM HAMPERED BY LACK OF SOURCES, BUT GOOD COOPERATION EXISTS WITH FRANCE AND UK, AND HOPEFULLY IN FUTURE WITH U.S. PURCHASE OF F-5'S IS MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY. EGYPT PREPARED TO MINIMIZE ITS FORCES AFTER PEACE WITH ISRAEL WITH EMPHASIS ON GREATER FIREPOWER AND MOBILITY AND DEPENDENCE ON RESERVISTS (WHO NOW NUMBER ONE MILLION). EGYPT CANNOT ACCEPT ALL OF ISRAEL'S DEMANDS FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SINAI. BEST SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL WOULD BE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND RESOLUTION OF PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. ISRAEL MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN  
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SECURITY AND LAND. END SUMMARY.

1. PEACE. EGYPT NEEDS PEACE AND IS DOING ITS BEST TO ACHIEVE IT AFTER FOUR WARS, BUT REALIZES IT WILL TAKE A "LONG, LONG TIME". EGYPT MUST RETAIN STRONG ARMED FORCES EVEN AFTER PEACE WITH ISRAEL BECAUSE OF OTHER THREATS, PARTICULARLY FROM ETHIOPIA AND LIBYA WHERE

USSR ESTABLISHING BELT DIRECTED AT THE SUDAN AND ULTIMATELY EGYPT. CURRENTLY 95 PERCENT OF EGYPTIAN FORCES ARE ON EASTERN FRONT WITH MINIMUM FORCES IN THE WEST AND NO MAJOR FORCES IN THE SOUTH. HOWEVER, IT HAS MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH SUDAN AND IF SUDAN THREATENED "WE HAVE PLANS TO MOVE INTO SUDAN."

2. MODERNIZATION OF FORCES. EGYPT HAS PLANS FOR MODERNIZATION BUT PROBLEM IS SOURCE OF ARMS. GOOD ARMS COOPERATION EXISTS WITH FRANCE AND UK AND PERHAPS IN THE FUTURE WITH THE U.S. ARMY IS NOT EXPERIENCING MUCH TROUBLE WITH MAINTENANCE OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT FOR LAND FORCES DESPITE EMBARGO. HOWEVER, EGYPT'S FIRST PRIORITY IS AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE AND DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCED BECAUSE MIGS HAVE NOT BEEN REPLACED AND SOVIETS ATTACH CONDITION FOR ALL COUNTRIES THAT OVERHAUL OF A/C BE DONE IN USSR. EGYPT DEPENDING ON FRANCE AND UK FOR NEW AIRCRAFT BUT HOPES TO HAVE F-5E'S. IT WOULD BE MISTAKE, HOWEVER, TO BELIEVE ALL OF EGYPT'S AIRCRAFT ARE GROUNDED.

3. REDUCTION IN FORCES AS PART OF SETTLEMENT. MAIN FACTOR WILL BE THE QUANTITY OF ARMS MAINTAINED BY ISRAEL. IF THEY MAINTAIN LARGE QUANTITIES EGYPT WILL BE OBLIGED TO DO SO ALSO. GAMASY HAD TOLD WEIZMAN THAT IF ISRAEL READY TO MINIMIZE ITS ARMED FORCES, EGYPT WILL ALSO  
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U.S. AND USSR ALSO WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO LIMIT ARMS SHIPMENTS. WHILE EGYPT PLANS TO SCALE DOWN SIZE OF ITS FORCES, ITS PLANS CALL FOR INCREASED FIREPOWER AND MOBILITY AND GREATER DEPENDENCE ON RESERVISTS.

4. F-5'S. PURCHASE OF F-5'S FROM U.S. IS MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY BECAUSE IT IS "FIRST STEP" IN U.S.-GOE MILITARY COOPERATION IN MANY YEARS. F-5'S WILL REPLACE MIG 17'S AND THEREFORE WILL GIVE EAF INCREASED CAPABILITY. IF F-5 DEAL FALLS THROUGH, EGYPT WILL HAVE TO DEPEND ON UK AND FRANCE, WHO ARE READY TO SELL ALL THE AIRCRAFT REQUIRED. HOWEVER, MONEY IS A PROBLEM. GIVEN REALITIES OF U.S. ARMS POLICY WHICH "ALWAYS KEEPS ISRAEL MILITARILY SUPERIOR", EGYPT DOES NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE F-15'S OR 16'S ANY TIME SOON. AS FOLLOW-ON AIRCRAFT TO F-5'S, IT WOULD LIKE PHANTOMS AND THEN LATER ON PERHAPS F-15'S AND 16'S. EGYPT ACCEPTED F-5 FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

5. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SINAI. ISRAELIS WANT ALL OF SINAI TO BE DEMILITARIZED BUT EGYPT CANNOT ACCEPT THIS. ISRAELIS DO NOT WANT ANY EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE

STATIONED IN SINAI AND THIS TOO IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT IS MAIN AREA OF EGYPT'S AIR DEFENSE. ISRAELIS WANT EARLY WARNING STATIONS IN SINAI. EGYPT WILLING TO AGREE TO HAVE EARLY WARNING STATIONS ON THE BORDERS AND IN A BUFFER ZONE, BUT THOSE IN BUFFER ZONE WOULD HAVE TO BE MANNED BY UN FORCES. THOSE ON BORDERS WOULD BE MANNED BY RESPECTIVE NATIONALITIES.

6. ARAB MILITARY COOPERATION. MILITARY COOPERATION CAN ONLY BEGIN WITHIN POLITICAL CONTEXT. IF THERE IS NO POLITICAL COORDINATION, THERE CAN BE NO MILITARY COORDINATION. PRIOR TO 1973 WAR THERE WAS GOOD POLITICAL AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH SYRIA, BUT AT PRESENT EVEN JOINT MILITARY COMMAND WITH SYRIA, WHICH GAMASY HEADS, CONFIDENTIAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 11282

7. USE OF ARMED FORCES FOR DEVELOPMENT. UP TO NOW EGYPT'S ARMED FORCES HAVE NOT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATED IN MODERNIZATION PROCESS. HOWEVER, THROUGH UNIVERSAL CONSCRIPTION ARMED FORCES PROVIDE MANY SKILLS THAT ARE USEFUL TO CIVILIAN SECTOR WHEN SOLDIERS DISCHARGED. WITH

PEACE, EGYPT MAY USE FORCES TO BUILD ROADS, IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES AS IN YUGOSLAVIA, ROMANIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES. UP UNTIL NOW, HOWEVER, ITS LARGE MILITARY COMMITMENTS IN THREE DIRECTIONS HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DO SO.

8. RESERVES. EMIGRATION OF EGYPTIAN WORKERS DOES NOT AFFECT THE MILITARY SINCE EGYPT HAS MORE THAN ENOUGH MANPOWER. IT CURRENTLY HAS ONE MILLION RESERVES. NO EGYPTIAN CAN LEAVE THE COUNTRY UNTIL HE HAS COMPLETED HIS MILITARY SERVICE AND THOSE WHO ARE NEEDED UNDER MOBILIZATION PLANS, ARE NOT ALLOWED TO LEAVE EVEN AFTER COMPLETING ACTIVE SERVICE.

9. DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUAL TRUST WITH ISRAEL. IF PEACE ACHIEVED, BEST GUARANTEE FOR ISRAEL IS NORMAL RELATIONSHIPS.

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RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, INCLUDING OPEN BORDERS AND DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. TRUST WOULD THEN DEVELOP AND PERHAPS IN FIVE YEARS EVERYTHING WOULD BE NORMAL, PROVIDED PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IS RESOLVED. SAME COULD BE TRUE WITH OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL. HOWEVER, IF PALESTINIAN PROBLEM NOT RESOLVED, THERE WILL BE CONTINUING TROUBLE, ESPECIALLY IN LEBANON AND JORDAN. FROM ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW, PEACE TREATY WITH NORMAL RELATIONS AND OPEN BORDERS IS BEST GUARANTEE OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY. NEVERTHELESS, BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO MAINTAIN "GOOD" ARMED FORCES. TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND SECURITY ISRAEL MUST ACCEPT TO LIVE WITHIN ITS OWN BORDERS AND GIVE UP EXPANSIONIST AIMS BECAUSE IT IS A SMALL COUNTRY OF 3 MILLION WHILE THERE ARE 100 MILLION ARABS. IF ISRAEL DOES NOT ACCEPT TO DO THIS, THE COMING ARAB GENERATIONS, EVEN IN EGYPT, WILL NOT BE WILLING TO LEAVE ANY PIECE OF LAND FOR ISRAEL. AT PRESENT, ISRAELIS WANT SECURITY AND LAND. THEY MUST CHOOSE.

10. THREAT OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISM TO EGYPT. TERRORISM EXISTS ALL OVER THE WORLD, BUT IT PRESENTS NO BIG PROBLEM FOR EGYPT. LIBYA HAD, DURING A NINE MONTH PERIOD, SENT SABOTAGE TEAMS INTO EGYPT. EGYPT TOLD THEM TO STOP BUT THEY DIDN'T DO SO. JULY 1977 CLASH RESULTED AFTER WHICH LIBYA STOPPED. EVEN WITH PEACE, THERE WILL BE EXTREMISTS LIKE ABU IYAD AND ABU NIDAL, WHO WILL TRY TO DISRUPT PEACE THROUGH TERRORISM. EGYPT CAN HANDLE THEM INSIDE EGYPT, BUT THERE IS ALWAYS DANGER OF ASSASSINATIONS OR ATTACKS ON EMBASSIES OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. EGYPT HAS ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO PROTECT ITS EMBASSIES AND OFFICIALS ABROAD. IN ANY CASE, TERRORISM IS NOT A BIG PROBLEM FOR EGYPT.

PALESTINIANS WITHIN EGYPT ARE CLOSELY CONTROLLED.

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## Message Attributes

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